Secondary Boycotts and the Ally Doctrine by Ettlinger, Raymond S.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 5 Number 3 Article 8 
4-1-1956 
Secondary Boycotts and the Ally Doctrine 
Raymond S. Ettlinger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Raymond S. Ettlinger, Secondary Boycotts and the Ally Doctrine, 5 Buff. L. Rev. 318 (1956). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol5/iss3/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
SECONbARY BOYCOTTS AND THE ALLY DOCTRINE
The Taft-Hartley Act provides in section 8(b) (4) (A) that secondary
boycotts constitute an unfair labor practice.' The Act does not specifically refer
to secondary boycotts by name, but the courts in interpreting this section have
by reference to the legislative history2 and other factors almost unanimously
agreed that the intent of Congress was to outlaw acts which constituted a secondary
boycott at common law.5 Acts which constituted primary activity are not covered
by the Act. As a result, the courts are faced with the double problem of finding
a secondary boycott and finding a violation of the exact wording of the statute.
Frequently the two become interwoven. It is in one of these interwoven areas
that the ally doctrine becomes an issue.
The courts have had frequent occasion to define a secondary boycott.4 One of
the District Courts illustrated the situation as one in which a labor organization
having a dispute with employer A induces the employees of employer B to
engage in concerted activity to cause B to cease dealing with A.P This is a very
clear, although somewhat oversimplified, definition of the nature of the secondary
boycott. It is interesting to note, however, that this court reached the conclusion
that a union which struck its own employer to prevent his using non-union goods
was not committing a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A), on the grounds that the
union was acting against the employer with whom it had the labor dispute. This
would sem to be at extreme variance with the plain wording of the statute, and
definitely contrary to the results reached by other courts in "hot goods" cases."
However, certain problems more complex have arisen in applying this
section; the ally doctrine represents one of these problems. To state the principle
concisely, it sometimes happens that an employer so enmeshes himself in a labor
1. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (b) (4) (A) (1952) provides as follows:
"8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization.. .. (4). to en-
gage in... a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to...
handle or work on any goods . . . or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is: (A). forcing or requiring any employer or ... other person to cease ...
dealing in the products of any other ... manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person."
2. E.g., 93 CONG. REc. 3950, 4323 (1947) (Senator Taft).
3. N.L.fl.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 28
L.R.R.M. 2108 (1951); N.L.R.B. v. Business Machine Mechanics, 228 F. 2d 553, 37
L.R.R.M. 2219 (2d Cir. 1955).
4. The Supreme Court gave the classic definition in Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering, describing a secondary boycott as... a combination not merely to
refrain from dealing with complainant, or to advise or by peaceful means persuade
complainant's customers to refrain, but to exercise coercive pressure upon such
customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw
patronage from complainant through fear of loss or damage to themselves should
they deal with it." 254 U. S. 443, 446 (1921).
5. Douds v. Sheet Metal Workers Internat'l Assn., 101 F. Supp. 273, 29
L.R.R.M. 2084 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
6. N.L.R.B. v. Carpenters Union, 218 F. 2d 226, 35 L.R.RM. 2310 (10th Cir.
1954).
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dispute between a union and another employer that he loses his status as a protected
person under section 8(b) (4) (A). Senator Taft, one of the original sponsors
of this section, specifically stated that the Act is not intended to protect employers
who co-operate with a struck employer so closely as to become the equivalent of
a party to his dispute.7
The first case to apply the ally doctrine was the Ebasco case," decided by
Judge Rifkind in a District Court in 1948. Ebasco was a corporation furnishing
engineering services to its customers. It had been customary for Ebasco to sub-
contract some of its work to Project, a partnership owned by the same principals
and engaged in the same field. When Ebasco underwent a strike by its employees,
it increased greatly the amount of work subcontracted to Project. Furthermore,
Ebasco's own foremen supervised the work at Project. In this situation, Judge
Rifkind decided that the union had a legitimate right to picket Project, saying:
"The evidence is abundant that Project's employees did work
which, but for the strike of Ebasco's employees, would have been done by
Ebasco. The economic effect upon Ebasco's employees was precisely that
which would flow from Ebasco's hiring strikebreakers to work on its
own premises. The conduct of the union in inducing Project's employees
to strike is not different in kind from its conduct in inducing Ebasco's
employees to strike. If the latter is not amenable to judicial restraint,
neither is the former. In encouraging a strike at Project, the union was
not extending its activity to a front remote from the immediate dispute
but to one intimately and indeed inextricably united to it.",,
The Ebasco decision has been one of the most widely cited cases involving
section 8 (b) (4) (A), though it has been more often distinguished than followed.
Although there has been no decision which in any way casts doubt on the validity
of the general principles of the Ebasco case, subsequent cases engendered consider-
able doubt as to the scope of the rule. For the purpose of understanding the
exact development of the ally doctrine, it will be beneficial to examine a case-by-
case history of the theory
7. "The spirit of the Act is not intended to protect a man who in the last
case I mentioned is co-operating with a primary employer and taking his work
and doing the work which he is unable to do because of the strike." 95 CONG. 8709(1949). President Eisenhower, in his January 1954 recommendations to Congress
for revision of the Taft-Hartley Act, included a suggestion which would make a
specific provision of the Act.
8. Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 21
L.R.R.M. 2256 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
9. Id. at 677, 21 LR.R.M. at 2260.
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Immediately after the Ebasco decision, another District Court, in the Mills
case,10 held that the subcontracting relationship found in the construction industry
furnishes an equal degree of alliance, resulting in non-application of the Act.
However, at the same time, the National Labor Relations Board in the Schenley
case"- decided that the relationship between the manufacturer of liquor and his
distributors was not close enough to result in non-neutrality on the part of the
distributors. The Board distinguished the Ebasco case by saying that the essence
of that case was the financial relationship between Ebasco and Project, a fact which
was not present in the Schenley case.' 2 The Board implied by this case that it
would look only for economic alliance in terms of common financial backing,
rather than in a contractual relationship. In affirming the order of the Board,
the Second Circuit indicated that it accepted this particular test, saying:
"There (Ebasco) was a case where a parent and a subsidiary part-
nership were conducting enterprises alternately as business exigencies
demanded. It was held that a strike which originated in the parent com-
pany might be extended to the subsidiary partnership without violation
of section 8(b) (4) (A). There the employees of the corporation and
the partnership were all working for the same employer and had prac-
tically identical interests. Here the corporations were completely separate
in ownership and management.' 13
The Board, when facing the issue of subcontracting in the construction
industry, in effect repudiated the Mills case by finding that this relationship did
not prevent application of the Act. The Climax case' 4 not only held that subcon-
tracting did not bypass the Act, but distinguished the Ebasco case on two distinct
grounds. First, the Board pointed out that the common ownership factor was
entirely lacking in the Climax situation. It went further to stress that the sub-
contracting of Climax Co. was a fact which had been present for some time before
the strike, and which had not increased to any appreciable extent after the strike
10. Mills v. United Journeymen of Plumbing Industry, 83 F. Supp. 240, 23
L.R.R.M. 2559 (W.D. Mo. 1949).
11. Wine, Liquor & Distillery Workers (Schenley Distillery Corp.), 78
N.L.R.B. 504, 22 L.R.R.M. 1222 (1948).
12. "The Metropolitan Architects case is not applicable to the facts of the
instant case. Here the record establishes that there is no financial or other con-
nection, other than that of seller and buyer, between Schenley and the wholesale
distributors involved. We hold that the language of the Act does not vest the
Board with discretion to allow a union to engage in secondary activity otherwise
unlawful, because of an essential alliance which rests solely on the fact that the
so-called ally is an independent sales outlet for the products of the primary em-
ployer." Id. at 507, 22 L.R.R.M. at 1224.
13. N.L.R.B. v. Wine, Liquor c Distillery Workers, 178 F. 2d, 584, 587, 25
L.R.R.M. 2137, 2139 (2d Cir. 1949).
14. Metal Polishers Union (Climax Machinery Co.), 86 N.L.R.B. 1243, 25
L.R.R.M. 1052 (1949).
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began. 15 In making the latter point, however, the Board went on to say that it
might have decided differently if there had been an increase in the subcontracting.
It indicated that under such circumstances the economic effect of which Judge
Rifkind had spoken might logically convert the activity from secondary to
primary.16 This dictum was the first indication by the Board of how it would apply
the ally doctrine by using any test other than common ownership.
Immediately following the Climax case, the Board indicated that its policy
would be to examine the facts of each case separately, rather than to establish set
rules as to the degree of alliance for any industry or any relationship. In the
Pettus-Bannister case,' 7 the Board re-opened the hearing for the sole purpose of
receiving evidence of the question of alliance in a case of subcontracting in the
construction industry. Although no alliance was found, the case is indicative of the
Board's approach to this problem.
The courts, on the other hand, have almost universally held that the sub-
contracting relationship common to the construction industry does not in itself
show an alliance within the meaning of the Ebasco rule. The Supreme Court, in a
group of cases decided simultaneously,'8 took a stand firmly in favor of protecting
the employers in this situation. The Second Circuit, in expounding the same prin-
ciple, expressed the following:
"In short, is a secondary boycott limited to pressure upon third
parties who are not engaged in the same venture with the unyielding
employer? We can see no basis for such a distinction. The gravamen of
a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear not upon the employer who
alone is a party to the dispute but upon some third party who has no
concern in it ... We cannot see why it should make any difference that
15. "Unlike the primary contractor in the Ebasco case, Adams did not exer-
cise employer attributes of management and control over the employees of Climax,
the sub-contractor. And unlike that case, the record here does not show that
Climax forfeited its neutrality and allied itself with Adams in the latter's labor
dispute, by accepting work which but for the strike Adams' employees would
have performed: All the record in the case does show is that Climax was attempt-
ing to continue its normal business dealings with Adams, in the same manner
and to the same extent as it had before the strike." Id. at 1253, 25 L.R.R.M. 1053-4.
16. "In these circumstances, it cannot be fairly said that Climax's continued
dealings with Adams had an economic effect upon Adams' striking employees
and their union similar to that which would flow from Adams' hiring strike-
breakers to do his work. Had it appeared otherwise, the Respondents' argument,
that the boycott action at Climax represented primary action against Adams,
might have had validity but that is an issue not now before the Board, and one
that need not now be decided." Id. at 1253, 25 L.R.R.M. 1054.
17. Journeymen Plumbers Union (Pettus-Bannister Co.), Case No. 10-CC-16,
Dec. 2, 1949 (unreported).
18. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U. S. 675, 28
L.R.R.M. 2108 (1951); Internat'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 341
U. S. 694, 28 L.R.R.M. 2115 (1951); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. N.L.R.B.,
341 U. S. 947, 28 L.R.R.M. 2121 (1951).
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the third person is engaged in a common venture with the employer, or
whether he is dealing with him independently. The phrase 'doing busi-
ness' would ordinarily cover doing any business which the third party is
free to discontinue, regardless of whether he is merely supplying materials
to the employer, or has subcontracted with him to perform part of a work
which the third party has himself contracted to do . . . [The phrase
'cease doing business' is general, and admits of no such evasion."'1
These words would on their face seem to indicate that the Second Circuit
had little respect for the entire ally doctrine, and at least one court drew that
conclusion.20 However, it must be borne in mind that the construction industry
cases have been concerned primarily with the "situs" doctrine,2 and the issue of
alliance has been secondary in almost every case. Indeed, it sometimes appears as
though alliance has been rejected in these cases only to avoid any evasion by the
union of the adverse ruling of the court on the situs doctrine. Moreover, the
decisions of the Supreme Court has been subjected to some criticism,2 2 and the
President's recommendations to Congress in 1954 for revision of the Taft-
Hartley Act 3 included a proposed change overruling these decisions. In addition,
the fact situations in these cases usually represent the converse of the Ebasco
case; almost invariably it is the non-union subcontractor with whom the union
has its dispute and the principal contractor who is the "secondary" employer in
the boycott aspect. Thus the economic effects on the employees relied on in the
Ebasco case and alluded to by the Board in the Climax case are not present in these
situations.
The Board has established the rule that the union has the burden of proof
as to alliance, once a prima facie case has been made out for violation of the
Act.24 Thus in effect alliance is an affirmative defense, rather than non-alliance
being an element of the violation. It is doubtful that this rule of proof has had
any serious effect, but it may be indicative of the distrustful attitude of the Board
toward this doctrine.
Only one important case before the Board has permitted avoidance of the
19. Internat'l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. N.L.R.B., 181 F. 2d 34, 37, 25
L.R.R.M. 2449, 2451-2 (2d Cir. 1950).
20. Curto v. Internat'l Longshoremen's Union, 107 F. Supp. 805, note 815-16,
31 L.R.R.M. 2168, note 2176-7 (D. C. Ore. 1952).
21. The situs doctrine represents a separate problem In the application of
Section 8(b) (4) (A), which will not be analyzed in this paper. Briefly, It may be
said that courts are split on the right of the union to picket the situs of Its
dispute with the primary employer when the picketing has inevitable secondary
effects; See e.g., notes 5, 10, 19, 20 supra.
22. See Cushman, Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYRAcus
L. REV., 109, 121-4 (1954).
23. See note 7, supra.
24. Teamsters Union v. Marsh Foodlines, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 37
L.R.R.M. 1004 (1955).
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Act by a finding of non-neutrality. The Irwin-Lyons case, in reaching this
result, based its conclusion entirely on the fact of common ownership rather than
on an economic effects test.25 The Board referred to the Ebasco decision, but used
it only to point to the common ownership present (although not emphasized)
in that case.
The Circuit Courts have used varying tests to determine whether a status
on non-neutrality exists. At least two cases have approached the problem by
analysing the relationship between the employers in much the same way as the
common law courts compared an employee and an independent contractor. 26
Although there is little doubt that a person who meets the definition of employee
within this test would be allied, it seems certain that the converse would not be
equally accurate. Barring the fact of common ownership in the Ebasco case, there
is no doubt that the relationship between 2basco and Project would have been
comparable to the independent contractor relationship. Furthermore, even if
Ebasco's foremen had not supervised the work at Project, eliminating any possible
fact of employee relationship, the decision of Judge Rifkind would in all likelihood
have been the same.
It is interesting to note that the ally doctrine was used on one occasion to
support a finding of a violation of section 8(b) (4) (A). The National Trucking
case2 7 represents a somewhat unusual fact situation in this respect. National was
engaged in the business of transporting automobiles; it picked up cars from
the Ford Motor Company and took them from there to its warehouse for reship-
ment to various points. The union struck National, and utilizing the "moveable
situs" doctrine placed pickets at Ford Motor Company. However, these pickets
stayed at the Ford plant too long to come within this rule, and the picketing would
have constituted a secondary boycott. Shortly thereafter National ceased its pickups
25. National Union of Marine Cooks (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B.
54, 25 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1949). The rationale of the Board was stated in these words:
"The Trial Examiner found that Coos River Boom Co.... is engaged.., in the
transportation of logs; that Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co. is a separate corporate
unity engaged in logging and sawmill operations; that the stock ownership
and managerial control in the Coos River Boom Co. and in Irwin-Lyons
Lumber Co. are vested, substantially, in the same individuals, and that both
companies are in effect engaged in one straight line operation, i.e., the
Lumber Company cuts the logs, the Boom Company transports the logs down the
river, and the Lumber Company saws the logs into lumber at the mill. On the
basis of these facts, we agree with the Trial Examiner that the Boom Company is
not a neutral or wholly unconcerned employer within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4) (A) of the Act. We therefore conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that the
respondent unions have not violated Section 8(b) (4) (A)." Id. at 56, 25 L.RR.M.
at 1094.
26. N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 219 F. 2d 870, 35
L.R.R.M. 2504 (10th Cir. 1955); N.L.R.B. v. Teamsters Union, 212 F. 2d 216, 34
L.R.R.M. 2058 (7th Cir. 1954).
27. N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers &§ Helpers, 228 F. 2d 791, 37 L.R.R.M. 2351 (5th
Cir. 1956)
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at Pord, and contracted with Air Travelers to pick up the cars at Ford for National.
The Union then chAnged its signs at Ford to constitute organizational picketing of
Air Travelers. When the action was brought alleging a secondary boycott, the
union advanced the defense that no dispute existed between it and Air Travelers.
The Circuit Court, however, ruled that Air Travelers was allied with National,
and action against the former would be treated exactly the same as action against
the latter. With this rationale, the Court was able to find a secondary boycott.
At this point, it would be well to analyze the rules of law which these cases
establish. The Ebasco case had laid down a universally accepted principle that
allied employers should not receive the protection of the Act. Indeed, at least one
case which arose long before the Act espoused the same rule in similar circum-
stances.2 8 Moreover, the rule is far narrower than the "unity of interest" test which
the New York courts had applied to secondary boycotts at common law.2D
However, in determining exactly what constitutes an allied employer, both the
courts and the Board seem to have had considerable difficulty in deciding upon
efficient criteria. Three separate tests have developed out of the Ebasco decision,
to meet with varying reactions by the courts.
The first of these tests might be called the contract relation test. This was the
basis of the Mills case, to the effect that the existence of a contract for work
between the primary and secondary employer was sufficient evidence of the
alliance. As has been mentioned before, this met with shortlived success, and
almost before it was recognized as a test both the Circuit Courts and the Supreme
Court completely rejected it. Even the textwriters and others who advocated
rejection of the Supreme Court rulings30 never contended that this test should be
established; the dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's rulings rested on issues
other than the ally doctrine.
The second test is the joint ownership principle, the basis for the Irwin-
Lyons decision by the Board. Certainly it does not seem at all unfair to refuse to
permit an employer to split his union problems by organizing two companies
doing work in the same industry. Of course, the rule should be and has been
restricted to companies within the same industry, and somewhat related in each or
most of the projects which constitute their work. However, the rule, although
proper, seems too narrow to cover the intent of Senator Taft3 ' and the other
proponents of the ally doctrine.
28. Iron Moulders Union v. Allis Chalmers, 166 Fed. 45 (7th Cir. 1908).
29. See Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 287, 11 N. E. 2d 190 (1937).
30. See Cushman, op. cit. supra note 22, at 121-4.
31. See note 7, supra.
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The third and by far the most important test arising from the Ebasco case
might be termed the economic effects rule. This is the rule which Judge Rifkind
stressed in his decision, saying that where the work of the third person was
equivalent to the hiring of strike-breakers, the union would be free to picket.
Until very recently, this rule had never been recognized other than by the
reference to it in the dictum of the Climax case. In December, 1955, the Second
Circuit picked it up and expanded it broadly, in a decision which may herald a
drastic revision in the ally doctrine. The Royal Typewriter case 32 is deserving of
thorough study. When service workers of Royal went on strike, Royal was left
with a large number of service contracts to fulfill, without any service employees
to do the work. As a result, Royal adopted the policy of advising each of its
customers, when service was requested, to contact an independent typewriter
company and send the invoice to Royal. This was done, and in most cases the custom-
ers sent Royal the original invoices which were paid by Royal directly to the inde-
pendent repair companies. The Board had held that there was no alliance, since
Royal did not itself select the repair companies. 33 The Second Circuit unanimously
reversed,34 in an opinion which compared this situation directly with the Ebasco
case, saying that the relationship between Royal and the independent repair
companies was, if not actually a subcontract, so closely analagous to it as to result
in, the application of the same rules of law. In addition to approving the Ebasco
decision generally, the Court specifically applied the economic effects rule, saying
in part:
"Where an employer is attempting to avoid the economic impact of
a strike by securing the services of others to do his work, the striking
union obviously has a great interest, and we think a proper interest, in
preventing those services from being rendered. This interest is more
fundamental than the interest in bringing pressure on customers of the
primary employer. Nor are those who render such services completely
uninvolved in the primary strike. By doing the work of the primary
employer they secure benefits themselves at the same time that they aid
the primary employer."35
This decision seems to leave no doubt that the dormant economic effects test has
once again come to life, in a way which considerably exceeds the scope given it in
its parent case.
32. N.L.1?.B. v. Business Machine Mechanics, 228 F. 2d 553, 37 L.R.R.M. 2219(2d Cir. 1955). The Royal Typewriter case actually decided two questions: the
right of a union to picket allies of a struck employer, and the, right to picket
customers of the struck employer. Although the decision represents a landmark
in both aspects, only the former is discussed in this article.
33. Business Machine Mechanics (Royal Typewriter Co., Inc.), 111 N.L.R.B.
317, 35 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1955).
34 The opinion of the court was written by Judge Lumbard; Judges Hand
and Medina each concurred in separate opinions.
35. 228 F. 2d 558-9, 37 L.R.R.M. 2222.
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The case leaves, however, many very important questions unanswered. Two
primary problems present themselves. The first, and the most easily answered,
is the question as to what a person obtaining services from a firm can do when
the firm is struck. The decisions of both the Ebasco and the Royal Typewriter
cases refer to the economic effects on the employees of the struck employers from
his contracting for the replacement services. There seems no reason to assume that
the person receiving the services would not be able to secure by himself, without
going to the struck employer, another source for these services, presumably with
immunity for both himself and his replacement source. In fact, the Board, faced
with this exact problem in one case, reached this conclusion:
"A secondary employer faced with a strike against his supplier of
services is not obligated to sit idly by, lest he forfeit his status as a
neutral; he may, without risking the protection which section 8(b)
(4) (A) accords him against the extension to his business of economic
conflicts in which he is not involved, seek other suppliers, devise other
methods, and employ other means to enable him to continue his business
on as nearly normal a level as possible."36
Equally important, however, and not as nearly settled, is the question of what
work another employer can safely assume without undergoing the risk of being
picketed himself. Regarding this the Second Circuit spoke in these terms:
"The ally employer may easily extricate himself from the dispute and
insulate himself from picketing by refusing to do that work. A case may
arise where the ally employer is unable to determine that the work he
is doing is 'farmed out.' We need not decide whether the picketing of
such an employer would be lawful, for that is not the situation here."37
This, of course, hardly constitutes an answer to what may well be the most
serious question posed by this decision. An employer may be well advised to
avoid work where there is any reason to anticipate that it might be the result of
a strike. Even if it may be assumed, by virtue of the fact that the Court mentioned
the distinction without deciding its effect, that there is a difference in status between
an informed and an uninformed ally, this would not completely solve the problem.
It may easily happen that an employer will take a job without any reason to
believe that it is struck work, and will learn, partway through a long project, that
it is struck work. Should he then be subjected to picketing, if he refuses to
discontinue? Who will reimburse him for the losses which he suffers by beginning
and not completing the job? Is this a breach of the contract which he innocently
36. Longshoremen's Ass'n. (N. Y. Shipping Ass'n.), 107 N.L.R.B. 686, 708, 33
L.R.R.M. 1221, 1222-3 (1954).
37. 228 F. 2d 559, 37 L.R.R.M. 2222-3.
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made with the struck employer? For an employer, there must be a considerably
more litigation before he can be sure of his position.
For the union, on the other hand, this leaves no doubt as to its effect. The
union can, with very little effort, insure its position by immediately -advising all
persons likely to receive the "farmed-out" work of the existence of the strike. In
this way, it is at the very least safe in picketing work received thereafter. Without
doubt, the union is placed in a far stronger position to put pressure on an
employer against whom it strikes than it was before the Royal decision.
Exactly what the full effect of this decision will be is impossible to predict.
Future cases will have to settle the several questions which have been raised. Of
one fact there can be no doubt: the ally doctrine, after seven years of famine,
is due for its years of feast.
Raymond S. Ettlinger
